
doi: 10.1414/78393
handle: 11380/1042117 , 11585/189151
The paper shows how basic forms of semantic contextualism and of alethic relativism cannot account for an intuitive and straightforward notion of disagreement, which characterizes those disputes of inclination that have been claimed to be better accounted for by those theories.
Relativism; Contextualism; Faultless Disagreement; Normative vs. Empirical Project; Revisionary vs. Descriptive Project., Philosophy; Relativism and disagreement; semantic contextulism
Relativism; Contextualism; Faultless Disagreement; Normative vs. Empirical Project; Revisionary vs. Descriptive Project., Philosophy; Relativism and disagreement; semantic contextulism
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