
doi: 10.1155/2014/415686
We study a local interaction model where agents play a finiten-person game following a perturbed best-response process with inertia. We consider the concept of minimalp-best response set to analyze distributions of actions on the long run. We distinguish between two assumptions made by agents about the matching rule. We show that only actions contained in the minimalp-best response set can be selected provided thatpis sufficiently small. We demonstrate that these predictions are sensitive to the assumptions about the matching rule.
game theory, model, 330, Evolutionary games, model,game theory,modèle,théorie des jeux, \(n\)-person games, \(n>2\), théorie des jeux, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, modèle, QA1-939, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Mathematics
game theory, model, 330, Evolutionary games, model,game theory,modèle,théorie des jeux, \(n\)-person games, \(n>2\), théorie des jeux, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, modèle, QA1-939, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Mathematics
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 2 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Average | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Average | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
