Secretary problems with inspection costs as a game
Copyright policy )Secretary problems with inspection costs as a game
A “secretary problem” without recall, with given rewards and inspection costs is considered as a game of an opponent against a statistician. Probability distributions on the set of arrangements of the arrivals and randomized stopping rules are the strategies for the two players. We give a condition under which minimax strategies may be obtained in a systematic way.
- University of Bern Switzerland
- DigiZeitschriften Germany
Minimax procedures in statistical decision theory, Decision theory for games, Optimal stopping in statistics, Article, 510.mathematics, randomized stopping rules, secretary problems, minimax strategies, inspection costs
Minimax procedures in statistical decision theory, Decision theory for games, Optimal stopping in statistics, Article, 510.mathematics, randomized stopping rules, secretary problems, minimax strategies, inspection costs
selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources.This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).4 popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.Average influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).Top 10% impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.Average
Citations provided by BIP!Popularity provided by BIP!