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ZENODO
Dataset . 2019
License: CC BY
Data sources: ZENODO
ZENODO
Dataset . 2019
License: CC BY
Data sources: Datacite
ZENODO
Dataset . 2019
License: CC BY
Data sources: Datacite
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Group size effects and critical mass in public goods games

Authors: María Pereda; Valerio Capraro; Angel Sánchez;

Group size effects and critical mass in public goods games

Abstract

This dataset accompanies the paper "Group size effects and critical mass in public goods games", https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-41988-3 It records participant decisions in a set of binary one-shot Public Goods Games with curvilinear payoff function (see details in the paper). The explanation of the data fields is present also in the metadata of the file: # Cooperation: 0=defection, 1=cooperation, 99=the participant did not make the decision # Group: interacting group size (N) # Treatment: Critical Mass Nc # dropout: 1=the participant did not make the decision, 0=the participant made the decision # incompleted: 1=participant did not make all the decisions of the experiment; 0=participant did made all the decisions of the experiment # female: 1=female, 0=male

Keywords

Public Goods Game, Game Theory, experimental data, experimental economics, group size effects, cooperation, Public Goods Game, Game Theory, experimental data, experimental economics, group size effects, cooperation

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selected citations
These citations are derived from selected sources.
This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).
BIP!Citations provided by BIP!
popularity
This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.
BIP!Popularity provided by BIP!
influence
This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).
BIP!Influence provided by BIP!
impulse
This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.
BIP!Impulse provided by BIP!
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