It has been argued, essentially following the Frazerian model of antiquity, [Before Philosophy, Henri Frankfort, et al.] that, among ancient cultures the world was conceived as a place populated entirely by entities, so that relation with the things in the world was essentially understood in terms of "I" and "Thou": subject and object, whether animate or inanimate, But this presumes - for reasons which seem quite sound to us - that in fact the subjective and objective worlds are generically different. Thus, it would seem that to parallel epistemological processes with ontological ones must be to make an error. The implication of this view is that, at best, the ancients failed to formalise the difference between the two realms, and, at worst, that such a distinction never occurred to them.

This is a section from 'J. G. Frazer and the Platonic Theory of Being' published by the Anshar Press in 2016. More information about the book can be found on the author's blog at: https://shrineinthesea.blogspot.co.uk/2017/10/jg-frazer-and-platonic-theory-of-being.html