The thesis of A Defense of Intellectual Property Rights, as the title makes clear, is that some legal protection of intellectual property rights is morally legitimate. At the very start of the book in Chap. 1, however, Spinello and Bottis are careful to describe their thesis in a way that clearly indicates their dissatisfaction with many existing laws protecting intellectual property. Their thesis should not be read as an endorsement of all existing legal protections: they set out their position clearly—a sensible move given that much of the intellectual property literature generates more heated sloganeering than light. This is such a crucial point to remember in reading this outstanding volume—and it is an outstanding contribution to the literature whether one agrees or not with their conclusions and analysis—that I think it helpful to let Spinello and Bottis speak for themselves; they make the point much more perspicuously than I could. After a brief survey of a number of laws they find problematic (including the Copyright Term Extension Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act), they state their position with precision and elegance: