The Neo-Moorean response to the radical skeptical challenge boldly maintains that we can know we're not the victims of radical skeptical hypotheses; accordingly, our everyday knowledge that would otherwise be threatened by our inability to rule out such hypotheses stands unthreatened. Given the leverage such an approach has against the sceptic from the very start, the Neo-Moorean line is an especially popular one; as well see, though, it faces several commonly overlooked problems. An initial problem is that this particular brand of anti-sceptical strategy is available only to a theory of knowledge that will compromise itself to especially weak epistemic standards—indeed, standards as weak as our epistemic grounds are for accepting the denials of skeptical hypotheses. And the grounds here are weak. After all, we can't support our claim to know the denials of skeptical hypotheses by appealing to any relevant discriminatory capacities, and nor is it at all clear that we can adduce any independent rational grounds that stand to favour the denial of any given skeptical hypothesis over its skeptical alternative. With this said, the aim here is to investigate whether the Neo-Moorean line could be advanced against the sceptic in a way that wouldn't require wholesale lowering of epistemic standards. Here it will be important to note that Sosa's (2007; 2009) recent virtue- based epistemology distinguishes between higher-grade and lower-grade knowledge, and for this reason, his view seems specially equipped to handle the problem of lowering epistemic standards—a problem that would otherwise seem to leave the Neo-Moorean line too pricey a gambit. Sosa, to put it plainly, could allowably grant us low-grade, animal knowledge of the denials of skeptical hypotheses and at the same time insist that not all knowledge (i.e. reflective knowledge) can be gained so cheaply. Voila! Unfortunately, as we'll see, Sosa's view as well the other two most plausible contender-views for maintaining a Neo-Moorean line—Greco's and Pritchard's—run (for similar reasons) into dead ends. What it turns out that none of these views could do effectively was to reconcile the Neo-Moorean commitment to knowing the denials of skeptical hypotheses with (i) the demand that we don't compromise the epistemic standards for knowing wholesale, and (ii) the thought that not just knowledge, but knowledge grade, gets preserved over closure. This special point about closure (and one rarely discussed) turns out to be especially devastating for what seemed like the most well-equipped strategies for taking up the Neo-Moorean line. Having set the scene as such, my final move in the paper is a positive one: to take up the task of reconciling Neo-Mooreanism with the epistemic standards worry as well as with the problem posed by closure for knowledge grade. The way out, I'll argue, is to take on board a unique variety of robust virtue epistemology according to which knowledge is thought to be situated a certain way within a gradient balance between ability and luck