Corrigendum to "Games With Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time"

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Other literature type , Preprint 01 Jan 2010 English Publisher:The Econometric SocietyJournal:Econometrica, volume 78, pages 1,155-1,159 (issn: 0012-9682,

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Authors: Hashimoto, Tadashi;

doi: 10.3982/ecta7441

Corrigendum to "Games With Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time"

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Abstract

Summary: \textit{Yu. Sannikov} [Econometrica 75, No.~5, 1285--1329 (2007; Zbl 1133.91003)] investigated properties of perfect public equilibria in continuous-time repeated games. This note points out that the proof of Lemma 6, required for the proof of the main theorem (Theorem 2), contains an error in computing a Hessian matrix. A correct proof of Lemma 6 is provided using an additional innocuous assumption and a generalized version of Lemma 5.

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Keywords

continuous time, 2-person games, repeated games, repeated games; continuous time, Brownian motion, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:C73

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