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330, Limited liability, Principal-agent models, contract theory, limited liability, Contract theory, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, moral hazard, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory, Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection), Moral hazard, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
330, Limited liability, Principal-agent models, contract theory, limited liability, Contract theory, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, moral hazard, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory, Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection), Moral hazard, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 5 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Average | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
