The addition of the foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) virus to the list of potential biological weapons agents in the draft of the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention ([1][1]) highlights changing perceptions of what is a biological weapon. Human pathogens such as Bacillus anthracis or Clostridium botulinum have long been the focus in biological weapons defense programs because of their imminent threats to our health. However, 2 years ago Iraq provided an example that comprehensive offensive biological weapons programs also consist of socioeconomic biological weapons like wheat cover smut and camel pox virus ([2][2]). This violation of the international ban on biological and toxin weapons by Iraq was brought to the attention of the international community by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) through its inspection and verification activities. UNSCOM was established after the Gulf War in 1991 and entrusted by the United Nations Security Council to take possession and supervise the destruction of all weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The mandate of UNSCOM was terminated in 1999. Today's farming industry is characterized by mass production, transport of livestock, and division of labor, a situation that creates numerous problems for dealing with a disease outbreak involving a highly contagious agent like the FMD virus. To contain the recent FMD epidemic that has the potential to spread to all of western Europe, authorities ordered the mass slaughtering of livestock, an approach previously used to counteract localized disease outbreaks. The economic losses are tremendous from not only the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of animals but also from the effects on tourism. Furthermore, secondary effects such as the rise in inflation due to higher food prices could make it harder for the European Central Bank—the equivalent to the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank—to reduce interest rates aggressively in a slowing economy. Higher interest rates would hurt the whole economy and reduce economic growth even further. The course of events in the outbreak of FMD in Great Britain and the rest of the European Community should alert us to the fact that the industrialized agricultural system is highly vulnerable to the introduction of socioeconomic weapons. The lack of adequate mechanisms to contain outbreaks of animal and plant diseases poses a serious risk to national security. National as well as global security would therefore benefit from a multilateral Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention that has a strengthened verification regime, as currently being discussed in Geneva, Switzerland (see also the news article by R. Stone). Such measures are critical to counteract any development, production, stockpiling, or use of biological weapons. 1. [↵][3]Information on the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is available at . 2. [↵][4]UNSCOM report S/1999/94 on status of disarmament and monitoring of Iraq's proscribed weapons, 29 January 1999, available at . [1]: #ref-1 [2]: #ref-2 [3]: #xref-ref-1-1 "View reference 1 in text" [4]: #xref-ref-2-1 "View reference 2 in text"