
handle: 10419/92773
AbstractThis paper analyzes the situation in which a national government introduces environmental regulations. Within the framework of an international duopoly with environmental regulations, an environmental tax imposed by the government in the home country can induce a foreign firm with advanced abatement technology to license it to a domestic firm without this technology. Furthermore, when the domestic firm's production technology is less efficient than that of the foreign firm, the foreign firm may freely reveal its technology to the domestic firm. These improvements through the voluntary transfer of technology imply that environmental regulations have positive impacts on innovation.
F18, L13, Environmental regulation, ddc:330, H23, International competition, Internationale Umweltpolitik, Q56, Technologietransfer, Duopoly, Internationaler Wettbewerb, Duopol, Theorie, Technology transfer, jel: jel:H23, jel: jel:F18, jel: jel:L13, jel: jel:Q56
F18, L13, Environmental regulation, ddc:330, H23, International competition, Internationale Umweltpolitik, Q56, Technologietransfer, Duopoly, Internationaler Wettbewerb, Duopol, Theorie, Technology transfer, jel: jel:H23, jel: jel:F18, jel: jel:L13, jel: jel:Q56
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 13 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Top 10% | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
