The deontological conception of epistemic justification and doxastic voluntarism

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article 01 Oct 1994 English Publisher:Oxford University Press (OUP)Journal:Analysis, volume 54, pages 282-284 (issn: 0003-2638, eissn: 1467-8284,

Copyright policy )

Authors: Kihyeon Kim;

doi: 10.1093/analys/54.4.282 , 10.2307/3328819

The deontological conception of epistemic justification and doxastic voluntarism

- Summary
- Metrics

Abstract

According to the deontological conception of epistemic justification as endorsed by most traditional epistemologists, one is justified in holding a belief if and only if one is in the clear, or epistemically responsible, in holding the belief. William Alston criticizes this conception and any theory of epistemic justification based on this conception. The crucial disability that Alston attaches to the deontological conception is doxastic voluntarism.

Related Organizations

University of Oklahoma
United States

Impact byBIP!

	selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).	14
	popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.	Average
	influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).	Top 10%
	impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.	Average