Even in its extended usage, the concept of bounded rationality bears the birthmark of its origins in economics. First and most obviously, it is about seeking the most efficient (not necessarily the best) means toward a given end, whether that is curing patients or proving theorems. Second, the means are whittled down to the most parsimonious possible, not only acknowledging cognitive limitations but actually imposing them, whether in the form of Morgan's canon, Methodist agnosticism about causes, or Entscheidungsproblem-like restrictions on the acceptable formulation of mathematical proofs. Third, these parsimonious restrictions all tend to minimize the role of reasonable deliberation in rationality, albeit in different ways. As an object of inquiry for the history of science, bounded rationality has great promise. But as a model of the history of science, as one long exercise in bounded rationality, its utility may apply more to future than past science.