I contrast somewhat individualist arguments for first-wave ''extended cognition'' and second-wave ''integrationist cognition'' with what we can identify as a third wave of arguments for ''socially and culturally distributed cognition'', in which individual cognition takes place within, is supported by, and is mutually co-constructed with larger social, institutional, normative, political and technological systems and cultural practices. Such accounts must respond to the objection of ''cognitive bloat''. When does a processes count as my cognitive process? This objection is not best rebutted, as Clark often attempts, by limiting extension to processes that play a similar role to internal brain processes. Nor is it best addressed, as Gallagher (2013) does, by appealing to enactive engagement as grounding ''ownership'' of a process. Rather, the solution is in our shared, evolving, normative and social practices of holding people responsible for their actions. I support this by drawing parallels between socially distributed cognition and feminist relational theory, which has already addressed the issue of individual autonomy within social practices that shape individuals' selves, values, and capacities. I end by highlighting political and ethical concerns raised by this conception of HEC regarding differential distribution of cognitive resources.