Multiculturalist critics of liberalism have condemned difference-blind liberal laws as generally insufficient for addressing contemporary questions of justice. Some academic studies have interpreted every contemporary challenge to laws in effect for the general public, whether these laws are liberal or not, as a conflict between liberalism and the demand for group-differentiated rights. This conceptual and normative challenge to liberalism rests on an insufficient number of case analyses of generally poor quality. Critics often fail to differentiate between the concrete terms of political conflict over the public expression of cultural difference and the conceptual and/or normative conflict over underlying principles, in this case difference-blind liberalism versus liberal-multiculturalism. A close empirical analysis of an actual political conflict shows that the tenets of difference-blind liberalism can indeed be marshaled to defend cultural difference. In this article, I challenge the common tendency of the liberal-multiculturalists to present difference-blind liberalism as the “sick man” of western political theory. The argument has five parts. I underscore in the first three sections some conceptual, methodological, and normative problems arising from liberal-multiculturalism itself. In the last two sections I analyze in detail two actual political conflicts over a public expression of difference—the headscarf affairs in France and in Turkey—which suggest that it is state-nationalism rather than difference-blind liberalism that underlies intolerance of cultural diversity.