
handle: 2078.1/4109 , 1814/16575 , 2381/2943
The purpose of this paper is to examine a model of network formation with costs where individual benefits from network formation are not known to the planner. A number of theorems and explanations is made for establishment of the proposed model. No numerical experiments are performed.
model, 330, Cooperative games, networks, planner, shapley value, mechanism design, Games involving graphs, Networks mechanism, payoffs
model, 330, Cooperative games, networks, planner, shapley value, mechanism design, Games involving graphs, Networks mechanism, payoffs
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