The aim of this paper is to show the con­ception of philosophical superstition un­derstood as something which is witho­ut any doubt false but considered as undoubtedly true. The conception is pre­sented in The Short Philosophical Dic­tionary of Superstitions of fr. Józef Ma­ria Innocenty Bocheński OP. Philosophical superstition differs from superstition in general, understood as beliefs and practices grounded in convic­tion that there exist cause-effect relation­ships, which are impossible to be empi­rically proven but are thought to have supernatural origin. Bocheński draws from philosophical realism, including classical conception of truth, and claims that philosophical superstition is a cognitive distortion cha­racterized by two: obviousness that a claim is false and universal conviction that this false claim is true. In this pa­per we present not only premises neces­sary to qualify some ideas as philosophi­cal superstition but also fundaments that initiate the proces of their creation. Ac­cording to Bocheński, we find remedy for superstitions in growing social signi­ficance of philosophers, whose main task would be to search and identify super­stitions. For that reason, in this work we speak of topic of the social role of philo­sophy. Bocheński claims that not every philosophy is equally destined to fulfill this task for many philosophical ideas contributed to create superstitions. The author of the Dictionary made St. Tho­mas a specific guide on the path of sear­ching and identifying superstitions. The additional aim of the paper is to show a historical context of perception of Bo­cheński’s book on philosophical super­stitions and describe his influence in va­rious environments. We focus on numerous editions (in Polish and fore­ign languages) and on main revisions.