The voltage regulation problem for inverter-interfaced power distribution networks has been investigated using different approaches in the current literature. Most commonly, it has been studied using the distributed droop control technique, which yields voltage stability through appropriate reactive power compensation. However, in the literature, these methods seek asymptotic voltage stability, which may be insufficient to characterize the reliability of the grid under intermittent fault/ attack scenarios. For this reason, in this work, we provide a framework of resilient control design in an attempt to quantify the desired response of safety-critical systems such as the power distribution grid. According to the proposed framework, we deem the power network resilient if i) it satisfies the given voltage stability objective under nominal conditions (when the disturbance/ attack signal is within the considered bounds) and ii) given an intermittent violation, the system is able to recover and re-establish the voltage regulation constraints in finite-time. We define these traits to be the durability and recoverability properties, respectively, of the proposed resilience framework. Furthermore, to enforce the proposed resilient framework on the inverter-interfaced power distribution network, finite-time robust control barrier function (FRCBF)-based design conditions are provided for the control of the consumer inverters. The main objective of the current study is to test the efficacy of the proposed resilient controller on a dedicated testbed for power inverter networks using hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) experiments. Towards that end, in this work, we simulated the power inverter network in real time using the OPAL-RT platform. Then, based on the sampled measurements from the grid that was being run in the real-time OPAL-RT simulator, the proposed resilient control scheme was employed to compute the corresponding control inputs for the consumer inverters, which was then fed back to the OPAL-RT simulation yielding the desired reactive power compensation from the consumer inverters. Furthermore, to showcase the effectiveness of our proposed approach, the voltage regulation problem was considered under the sign-flipping step power injection attack that yielded the maximum deviation of the nodal voltage trajectories. The resulting voltage trajectories were then studied to verify if the proposed controller yielded resilient characteristics for the grid, given the voltage regulation objective. The following conclusions were reached: 1. Under the proposed resilient control action, the power grid was deemed durable as the voltage trajectories remained within the stipulated range when the power injection attack remained within the considered bounds. 2. At the activating (and the sign-flipping) instance of the attack signal, when the considered bounds on the attack vector were violated, the voltage trajectories were perturbed. However, once nominal conditions returned and the resilient controller was reinstated, the voltage trajectories were observed to recover in finite-time, thereby demonstrating the recoverability trait from the resilience framework. The following aspects of the study remain unresolved: 1. The results stated above were obtained for a distribution grid with 5 nodes. The scalability of the proposed control design scheme needs to be further investigated to see if our approach remains viable for larger networks. 2. The performance of the proposed controller need to be further evaluated against other attack/ fault scenarios that are commonly encountered.