plausible that the common-sense view or at least a common-sense view is that such legislation is legitimate because it prevents the relevant inten tions being carried out: that is, because it prevents a crime (murder or a terrorist act) from being committed. If that is right, then these really are cases of prepunishment, as Smilansky defines it. The requirement that there be actual intentions and preparations can be seen merely as a reflection of the fact that these are the routes by which prosecutors come to have reasonable beliefs about what will happen if they do not intervene. (I do not say that they should be so seen; only that such a characterization of this kind of legislation has a perfectly good claim to being a common-sense view.) Smilansky's argument thus fails on two counts. It fails to show that the permissibility of prepunishment runs counter to our ordinary intuitions; and even if it succeeded on this front, it would fail to demonstrate the falsity of compatibilism, because it would still fail to show that determin ism makes a difference to anything, morally speaking.