Moral judgments have two characteristic features. On the one hand they aim at objectivity. We normally think there are correct answers to be found on moral matters, and we think that is possible for our moral judgments to be mistaken. In this respect moral judgments behave as ordinary beliefs. On the other hand moral judgements are essentially practical. They are action guiding and closely connected to motivation. In this respect they behave as desires. If we combine these two features with a popular view in moral psychology, namely that a belief alone cannot motivate, we have three independently plausible claims, which seem to be internally inconsistent. This is what Michael Smith has called the moral problem. . In this thesis I give a discussion of Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism as a solution to the moral problem. Blackburn argues that moral judgments are expressions of attitudes and not beliefs. As such he can account for the motivational aspect of moral judgements. This does however not mean that we must give up objective pretensions of moral discourse. Quasi-realism promises to explain and justify our intuitions of moral objectivity without relying on metaphysically demanding notions of moral facts or properties. The first part of the thesis deals with moral psychology. More specifically I discuss motivational internalism and the Humean theory of motivation. I argue that most plausible version of internalism is incompatible with quasi-realism. In the second part of the thesis I discuss the quasi-realist attempt to justify our intuitions of moral objectivity. I defend Blackburn against accusations of moral mind-dependence but argue that the quasi-realist project ultimately fails because it cannot give a non-revisionary account of moral fallibility