Despite the large volume of literature on contracting out and the growth of publicly-funded yet externally-delivered goods and services at all levels of government, far less attention has been paid to financially effective contract management. In particular, the question as to under which conditions public funds can be spent in cost-effective and accountable ways given the current contracting out system is still open. Based on a mixed methods approach with data derived from two Web-based surveys and 23 semi-structured interviews with local public contract managers and private contractors in New Jersey, this dissertation attempts to fill this gap in the scholarship by empirically exploring factors that are related to perceived contracting financial performance in the context of cost-effectiveness and financial accountability. The findings of quantitative data analyses revealed that higher competition in bids, public-private competition, intensive and fair monitoring, use of rewards and sanctions, and government management capacity are significantly associated with higher levels of perceived contracting financial performance. Public and private contract managers commonly viewed that longer contracting relationships led to improved financial accountability but not to cost-effectiveness. Public contract managers, however, were more critical of their nonprofit counterparts with regard to satisfactory contracting financial performance, whereas private contract managers held more positive views of nonprofit contractors. Furthermore, based on the findings from qualitative data analyses, conditions that improve the financial outcomes of contracting out and reduce the incidence of corruption include fair and competitive bids without favoritism, contract specificity, a statewide contractor performance database, sufficient staffing with well-trained personnel, strong leadership, team-based organizational structures, two-way communication, and evaluations based on qualitative and quantitative values. While public contract managers tended to place greater value on visible organizational and managerial factors, private contract managers were more likely to value invisible and relational factors that may cost more in the long run. Overall, this dissertation contributes to the scholarship on local government contracting by casting new light on financially effective contract management, enriching the literature through a multi-organizational perspective, and providing more feasible guidance to current contract managers of financially and ethically low performing local government agencies to foster their success.