Can a convincing case be made for the claim that a good God has revealed something to us? We are not asking whether religious belief is rational, or might be properly basic. We are rather asking the question the unconvinced demand be confronted. The standard way of arguing the affirmative creates a huge, unnecessary problem by tacitly presupposing that a sound case for a revelatory claim requires first working up a highly plausible argument for the existence of a good God. Once it is seen that this presupposition is false, the way is open to following a nonstandard philosophical path. For if facts about the universe yield enough evidence to show that the existence of a creator of some ilk is not highly implausible, it is possible that the content of a putative revelation might serve to close the evidential gap. And, we contend, our knowledge of the universe does yield the required modicum of evidence. It turns out, then, that !l negative conclusion about the existcllce of God is untmrranted unless the contellt of revelatory claims has been considered.