We can distinguish between conceptual analysis of terms in the communal language and conceptual analysis of terms in one’s own idiolect. The former can be called “communal conceptual analysis”, whereas the latter can be called “idiolectal conceptual analysis”. The present paper provides a systematic exposition and defence of idiolectal conceptual analysis, considering its possible and actual use in philosophical inquiry, as well as some of the most important criticisms that can be raised against it. The two most influential kinds of criticism that have been raised against conceptual analysis in general are based on semantic externalism and empirical studies of judgements about possible cases respectively. I argue that both of these kinds of criticism apply mainly to communal conceptual analysis and not to idiolectal conceptual analysis. Furthermore, I argue that even though there is some evidence that most well-known and widely discussed instances of using conceptual analysis have been instances of communal conceptual analysis, idiolectal conceptual analysis can also play a significant role in philosophical inquiry. Thus, the paper suggests a shift of focus from communal conceptual analysis to idiolectal conceptual analysis.