Preface The Problem of Human Freedom Skepticism Regarding Free Will A Fundamental Source of Difficulty The Significance of Free Will Challenges to Free Will Arguments for Incompatibilism Alternative Possibilities The Compatibility Question Simple Arguments for Incompatibilism Detailed Arguments Compatibilist Replies Conclusion Compatibilist Arguments and Free Will Accounts Positive Arguments for Compatibilism Incompatibilist Replies Compatibilist Conceptions of Freedom New Directions Varieties of Libertarianism Libertarianism and Indeterminism Competing Incompatibilist Accounts: T-1, A-C, and T-3 Theories Undefeated Authorization of Preference Challenges to the Proposed Indeterminist Model of Free Agency The Concept of Moral Responsibility The Function of Moral Responsibility Ascriptions Accounts of Moral Responsibility Conclusion Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities The Principle of Alternate Possibilities The Failure of Frankfurt-Type Cases to Show the Falsity of PAP Why PAP Is False Incompatibilism Without PAP Conclusion