Framing effects occur when logically equivalent redescriptions of objects or outcomes lead to different behaviors, and, traditionally, such effects have been seen as irrational. However, recent evidence has shown that a speaker's choice among logically equivalent attribute frames can implicitly convey (or "leak") normatively relevant information about the speaker's reference point, among other things. In a reinterpretion of data published elsewhere, in this article it is shown that some common effects in inference tasks (covariation assessment and hypothesis testing) can also be seen as framing effects, thereby expanding the domain of framing. It is also shown that these framing effects are normatively defensible because normatively relevant information about event rarity is leaked through the description of data and through the phrasing of hypotheses, thereby broadening the information leakage approach to explaining framing effects. Information leakage can also explain why framing effects in such inference tasks disappear under certain conditions.