This paper explores how a domestic terrorist attack orchestrated by a Japanese religious group sparked an important question for legal scholars, policymakers, and citizens: How do we prosecute terrorists without jeopardizing the freedom for religious practice? On the one hand, a lack of prosecution breeds sneakier behavior from terrorist groups, and potentially more fatal attacks against the public. On the other hand, too much prosecution can perpetuate religious stereotypes, profiling every small religious group as cult-like and terroristic. By reviewing relevant laws and acts that were applied to Aum Shinrikyo’s trial after the Tokyo gas attack, including the Subversive Activities Prevention Law of 1952 and the Religious Corporations Act of 1951, this paper highlights how Japanese courts have attempted to prosecute dangerous religious groups without outlawing the practice of the religious tenets themselves. This paper also includes how Aum’s actions could fit more of these laws than what was applied in the Aum trials, highlighting Aum’s violent actions against dissenters prior to the 1995 Tokyo gas attack. This paper also includes how problems of religious discrimination and the lack of aid for former Aum members remains an issue in the twenty-first century, especially with Aum victim aid projects facing funding cuts and premature shutdowns. These funding cuts and shutdowns come in the wake of Aum members being recognized as victims of Aum Shinrikyo in the same way that gas attack victims are, potentially highlighting a bias against Aum members perpetuated by the government itself.