I N A psychology course I once took, our professor told a student under hypnosis that his watch had been stolen. When the subject came out of his trance and demanded the watch, the professor lifted the subject's sleeve to disclose the watch still on his wrist. The student stared at it unbelievingly, then turned away and renewed his angry accusations. The strident prophets of automated doom are like that myopic student, for they require no evidence to support their thesis and ignore hard evidence to the contrary. Their thesis may be stated like this: Computers and automated devices are growing so 'intelligent' that we face technological unemployment in a world of computerized plenty; if we do not institute sweeping social changes we are doomed to a hopeless conflict with technology in a soulless future. This is an interesting subject for discussion, not for its entrancing science-fiction overtones, but because of its bearing on the problem of how to teach judgment. Theodore 0. Yntema has suggested that our schools are so pre-occupied with specific principles that they neglect the more enduring field of perceiving and solving problems. "Where and how," he asks, "is the student to learn perception of the problem and discovery of hypothesis? How much practice does he get in taking a vague general idea and converting it into specific form to be tested? How does a student learn to summon and take account of all pertinent evidence and to appraise its relevance, its importance and its credibility? How does he learn to form sound judgments?" 1