
handle: 10419/284248
We consider optimal anonymous consumption taxes in situations where the magnitude of an externality varies with individuals who cause it. For instance, urban fuel consumers generate greater pollution damages compared to rural consumers, but both groups are subjected to the same fuel tax. We provide a condition for the validity of the targeting principle, where external concerns are only addressed through the tax imposed on the commodity responsible for the externality. When this condition holds, one can separate the equity/efficiency and environmental components of this tax. An illustration suggests that Pigovian considerations would explain most of the fuel tax in France.
330, H23, Local externality, Pigovian tax, Pigoviantax, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, D12, pollution, local externality, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Q53, Subsidies, Q54, ddc:330, Budget de famille, targeting principle, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q54 - Climate • Natural Disasters and Their Management • Global Warming, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Fuel, Pollution, commodity taxes, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics/D.D1.D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q53 - Air Pollution • Water Pollution • Noise • Hazardous Waste • Solid Waste • Recycling, Targeting principle, and Revenue/H.H2.H23 - Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies, H21, and Revenue/H.H2.H21 - Efficiency • Optimal Taxation, Consumption taxes
330, H23, Local externality, Pigovian tax, Pigoviantax, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, D12, pollution, local externality, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Q53, Subsidies, Q54, ddc:330, Budget de famille, targeting principle, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q54 - Climate • Natural Disasters and Their Management • Global Warming, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Fuel, Pollution, commodity taxes, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics/D.D1.D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q53 - Air Pollution • Water Pollution • Noise • Hazardous Waste • Solid Waste • Recycling, Targeting principle, and Revenue/H.H2.H23 - Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies, H21, and Revenue/H.H2.H21 - Efficiency • Optimal Taxation, Consumption taxes
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