HILOSOPHY is a struggle over pronouns. What movement is possible between "we" and "I"? Or, to express the matter differently, is there an epistemic priority of the "we" over the "I"? Does the "we" hold many "I's" within it-"I's" which comprise the "we"-or is the "we" generated by the "I"? And if the "we" is generated by the "I," is that "we" nothing more than the composite of "I's"? Further questions about the relationship between the "we" and the "I" seem to dislocate those pronouns from their linguistic sockets: Is "we" one or many? Is the "I" recoverable in the course of expressing itself or is the destiny of the "I" to lose itself in the "we"? Some philosophers have rebelled against the false questions that would arise in the wake of that separation-an intoxication which would lead to the debasement of philosophy. George H. Mead speaks of "a vast amount of philosophic riffraff known as epistemology."3 To be sure, if the "I" is understood as an "emergent" from the "we," as Mead conceives the matter, then epistemology is bypassed; traditional epistemological questions are answered by never being raisedthe need for them has vanished.