As one would expect this is an interesting book, although also a slightly quirky one. In it Harman defends a version of moral relativism, and Thomson defends a version of its apparent opposite, a thesis of moral objectivity. Then each has a go at the other. Arguably, this is the best part of the book: I think that each makes serious inroads into the other's paper, and I doubt if I can do better in a short space. So my comments will be relatively unsystematic. It is notoriously hard to say what is intended by moral relativism. And I for one think it ought to be notoriously hard to say what is intended by moral objectivity, or moral absolutism. If my own work in ethics has any value, it makes these things even harder. For my figure, the quasi-realist, has the uncomfortable habit of taking to his bosom sayings that might have been thought to be the private property of realists or absolutists, yet without abandoning his expressivist starting point. Thomson, it seems to me, is a little insensitive to the threat this position poses. At any rate, she is content to define her objectivism in quite simple terms: it is possible to find out that some moral sentences are true. I certainly believe this. After all, as Wittgenstein, Ramsey, and Frege all remind us 'p' is true means p. Are there moral examples where it is possible to find out p? Certainly. It is possible to find out that Bill behaved wickedly. It wasn't an accident: he deliberately placed the spider in Mary's bed for mischief. That is wicked enough, in my book, and I hope in yours (if not, substitute a rattlesnake). I don't think anybody sensible denies that we can find this kind of thing out, and certainly not Harman. Perhaps then this kind of example is not supposed to count. But why not? One can hear some moral philosophers saying that we have only found out what Bill did, but that is not the same as finding out that he behaved wickedly. We haven't thereby found out that it is wicked to place spiders in peoples' beds for mischief. This is changing the subject, but in any case we can imagine someone finding that out as well, if she stood in moral space somewhere so odd that she needed to: she could come to realize how much it distresses the victim, and then how