We often use conditionals of the form 'If it's f then it's always g' to express the conviction that, because of the relationships between things in the world, if a thing is an f, this is a ground for concluding that it is a g. It is the form we most frequently use to express the relationships we believe to exist in nature between things, and we continue to use it in spite of the fact that we know that the truth of any assertion having the form is not deducible from the truth of any non-conditional assertion or group of assertions about the properties of things. No one disputes that the logical properties of this general conditional differ from those of the general conditional of standard predicate logic. If we give to 'A entails B ' the meaning 'the logical properties of A and B permit the deduction of B from A', then while we accept that (Al) ' (3x) (fx) entails (x) (fx gx) (A2) (x) (gx) entails (x) (fx gx) (A3) (x) (fx n gx) . (x) (fx> N gx) is self-consistent are all true, we regard (B1) 'Nothing is ever f' entails 'If it's f then it's always g' (B2) ' Everything is g ' entails ' If it's f then it's always g ' and (B3) 'If it's f then it's always g and if it's f then it's always not-g ' is self-consistent