The theological doctrine of middle knowledge attributes to God a particular kind of knowledge concerning the future, knowledge which would be denied to God by theists who do not hold this doctrine. Consider the case of Elizabeth, a graduate student in anthropology. Her adviser is wondering whether to recommend her for a foundation grant in support of an exciting but potentially risky field work assignment among a tribe who have only recently renounced their ancestral bent for head-hunting and cannibalism. He asks himself whether, if offered the assignment, she would accept it, or whether she would prefer a safer but less challenging assignment studying a relatively placid group of South Sea islanders. Now Elizabeth's advisor may find himself unable to decide what Elizabeth would do if offered the foundation grant, or he may reach the wrong conclusion about what she would do. But God, it may be thought, surely must know what Elizabeth would do: he knows whether, if offered the grant, she would accept it or reject it. Still, this conclusion is not inevitable, not even if one accepts that God has comprehensive knowledge of the future. To be sure, if Elizabeth is in fact offered the grant then either she will accept it or she will reject it, and God, who is assumed to have comprehensive foreknowledge, will know what it is that she will in fact do. But (it might be argued) what God knows in this case is Elizabeth's actual decision either to accept the offer or to reject it. But if the offer is never made, then neither does Elizabeth make a decision whether or not to accept it: there is no such decision for God to