In the past two decades much has been written on the topic of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, perhaps even too much, but there remains, in the recent discussion, an important point of dispute, one that should, I believe, finally be put to rest. The point of dispute concerns the appropriateness of causal-sounding language (i.e., the language of "bring it about that") in the following kind of context: Suppose that an essentially omniscient God should believe at an earlier time T1 that Smith will perform an action A at a later time T1, and suppose that Smith is nonetheless free to refrain from A at T.. Does it follow from these suppositions that it is within Smith's power to bring it about that God held a different belief at T1? It certainly follows that it is within Smith's power to do something such that, were he to do it, God would have held a different belief at TV. But does it also follow that it is within Smith's power to bring it about that God held a different belief at TX?' In what follows, I shall argue that such causal-sounding language is altogether appropriate, and it is appropriate for this reason: if there is an essentially omniscient God who holds beliefs in time, then Smith has free will only if he has a certain kind of power over the past, only if it is within his power at T. actually to determine which belief God held at T,; and if Smith does have such power over the past, then it is indeed within his power at T. (unexercised of