Although he has published a great many interesting pieces on a great many philosophical topics, I shall be primarily concerned in these remarks with Sosa's epistemology, in particular his account of the epistemic concepts of knowledge and justification. One of the virtue's of Sosa's virtue-based account of epistemic concepts is that he avoids unnecessary polarization. To a very large extent his approach represents an attempt to reconcile the important insights of reliabilism, traditional foundationalism, and the coherence theory of justification. The product is an extremely sophisticated and complicated view that has evolved through a number of different articles (most of which are contained in a collection of his essays, Knowledge in Perspective1). It is a view that is by no means easy to summarize, but I shall nevertheless try to highlight what I take to be some of the most fundamental features of Sosa's approach to analyzing epistemic concepts. One of the key conceptual building blocks of epistemic concepts, for Sosa, is the concept of an intellectual virtue. At least most of