On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein's Game
Copyright policy )On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein's Game
In this paper we provide an exact non-cooperative foundation of the Nash solution via a unique (weakly) subgame perfect equilibrium payoff vector in a two-person bargaining game, which is a modification of the well-known alternate offer game by Rubinstein (1982). We also discuss the extent to which our exact and approximate supports of the Nash solution allow an implementation of the Nash solution in (weakly) subgame perfect equilibrium. We show that a sound interpretation as an implementation can only be found in very rare cases where the domains of players’ preferences are extremely restricted.
- Universität Klagenfurt Austria
- Bielefeld University Germany
- University of Paderborn Germany
- Istanbul Bilgi University Turkey
330, ddc:330, Non-cooperative foundation, Rubinstein game, non-cooperative foundation, Nash solution, Nash program, C71, HB1-3840, C72, C73, Subgame perfect equilibrium, Implementation, JF20-2112, C7, Economic theory. Demography, Political institutions and public administration (General), implementation
330, ddc:330, Non-cooperative foundation, Rubinstein game, non-cooperative foundation, Nash solution, Nash program, C71, HB1-3840, C72, C73, Subgame perfect equilibrium, Implementation, JF20-2112, C7, Economic theory. Demography, Political institutions and public administration (General), implementation
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