Optimal Grading
Copyright policy )Optimal Grading
The teacher–student relationship is modeled as an agency problem, where teachers are concerned with human capital formation and students with ability signaling. We distinguish between two cases depending on whether in ability inference the job market can or cannot observe the grading rule applied. We show that many empirical grading patterns, including grade compression and inflation, are all consistent with optimal ability screening when grading rules are unobservable. With observable grading rules, the teacher perfectly screens students' abilities, provided that certain conditions hold. We apply the model to discuss policy applications such as “No Child Left Behind.”
- University of Bath United Kingdom
- University of Zurich Switzerland
Economics and Econometrics, Economics of information, teacher-student relationship, Labor market, contracts, grading rule, 2002 Economics and Econometrics, ability signaling, 330 Economics, human capital formation, Principal-agent model, teacher-student relationship, costless rewards, grading rules, mismatch of abilities and grades, grade inflation, teacher incentives, 10007 Department of Economics, IEW Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former), Economic growth models, Mechanism design, non-pecuniary incentives, op- timal grading schemes, mismatch of grades and abilities, com- pression of ratings, jel: jel:C70, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:D86, jel: jel:J41, jel: jel:I20
Economics and Econometrics, Economics of information, teacher-student relationship, Labor market, contracts, grading rule, 2002 Economics and Econometrics, ability signaling, 330 Economics, human capital formation, Principal-agent model, teacher-student relationship, costless rewards, grading rules, mismatch of abilities and grades, grade inflation, teacher incentives, 10007 Department of Economics, IEW Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former), Economic growth models, Mechanism design, non-pecuniary incentives, op- timal grading schemes, mismatch of grades and abilities, com- pression of ratings, jel: jel:C70, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:D86, jel: jel:J41, jel: jel:I20
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