
handle: 2078.1/4468 , 11568/963195 , 11568/963175 , 11585/73390
In the spirit of Arrow (The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1962), we examine, in an oligopoly model with horizontally differentiated products, how much a firm is willing to pay for a process innovation that it would be the only one to use. We show that different measures of competition (number of firms, degree of product differentiation, Cournot vs. Bertrand) affect incentives to innovate in non‐monotonic, different and potentially opposite ways.
innovation; profit incentive; oligopoly; product differentiation, INNOVATION; PROFIT INCENTIVE; OLIGOPOLY; PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION, Oligopoly, innovation, profit incentive, oligopoly, product dierentiation., Innovation, Product differenciation, Profit incentive, jel: jel:O31, jel: jel:L13
innovation; profit incentive; oligopoly; product differentiation, INNOVATION; PROFIT INCENTIVE; OLIGOPOLY; PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION, Oligopoly, innovation, profit incentive, oligopoly, product dierentiation., Innovation, Product differenciation, Profit incentive, jel: jel:O31, jel: jel:L13
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 36 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Top 10% | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
