
handle: 10419/86323
Taking technological differences between firms as given, we show that the technologically advanced firm has a stronger incentive for technology licensing under a decentralized unionization structure than with centralized wage setting. Furthermore, We show that, in presence of licensing, the incentive for innovation may also be stronger under decentralized unions. Unions have a clear preference for centralization only if productivity improvements are relatively small.
L13, O34, ddc:330, innovation, welfare, Licensing, downstream market, upstream market, Licensing; downstream market; upstream market; innovation; welfare, D43, jel: jel:D43, jel: jel:O34, jel: jel:L13
L13, O34, ddc:330, innovation, welfare, Licensing, downstream market, upstream market, Licensing; downstream market; upstream market; innovation; welfare, D43, jel: jel:D43, jel: jel:O34, jel: jel:L13
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 44 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Top 10% | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
