
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.828444
handle: 10419/322672
In this paper we characterize a situation in which non-calculative trust has to play a role in the decision to cooperate. We then analyze the given situation in game theoretical terms and distinguish those aspects of players' decisions that are cooperative from those that may be interpreted as being trustful. We argue that the cooperative aspect relates to incentives while the trustful (and thus non-calculative) aspect of the decision is related to the framing of the situation.
framing, ddc:330, cooperation, alliances; cooperation; focal points; framing; trust, trust, alliances, focal points, trust, framing, focal points, alliances, cooperation, jel: jel:D80, jel: jel:Z13, jel: jel:D74, jel: jel:C72
framing, ddc:330, cooperation, alliances; cooperation; focal points; framing; trust, trust, alliances, focal points, trust, framing, focal points, alliances, cooperation, jel: jel:D80, jel: jel:Z13, jel: jel:D74, jel: jel:C72
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 1 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Average | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Average | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
