Note on 'Competition in Two-Sided Markets'
Copyright policy )Note on 'Competition in Two-Sided Markets'
We extend the models in ("Competition in Two-sided Markets" of Armstrong (2006, 'Rand Journal of Economics') by adding within-group externalities. In the monopoly and duopoly cases, positive within-group externalities reduce the price of the own group. Negative externalities have an opposite price effect. In the case of a competitive bottleneck, we show by examples that within a certain range of parameter values, a novel phenomenon arises that the platform attracts more agents from one of the groups compared with the social optimum.
- University of Amsterdam Netherlands
- School of Business and Economics, Econometrics and Operations Research Netherlands
- Tinbergen Institute Netherlands
- Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Netherlands
Competition economics, ddc:330, L4, Competition economics, two-sided market, two-sided market, D4, jel: jel:L4, jel: jel:D4
Competition economics, ddc:330, L4, Competition economics, two-sided market, two-sided market, D4, jel: jel:L4, jel: jel:D4
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