Powered by OpenAIRE graph
Found an issue? Give us feedback
image/svg+xml Jakob Voss, based on art designer at PLoS, modified by Wikipedia users Nina and Beao Closed Access logo, derived from PLoS Open Access logo. This version with transparent background. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Closed_Access_logo_transparent.svg Jakob Voss, based on art designer at PLoS, modified by Wikipedia users Nina and Beao Journal of Economic ...arrow_drop_down
image/svg+xml Jakob Voss, based on art designer at PLoS, modified by Wikipedia users Nina and Beao Closed Access logo, derived from PLoS Open Access logo. This version with transparent background. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Closed_Access_logo_transparent.svg Jakob Voss, based on art designer at PLoS, modified by Wikipedia users Nina and Beao
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Article . 2016 . Peer-reviewed
License: Elsevier TDM
Data sources: Crossref
image/svg+xml Jakob Voss, based on art designer at PLoS, modified by Wikipedia users Nina and Beao Closed Access logo, derived from PLoS Open Access logo. This version with transparent background. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Closed_Access_logo_transparent.svg Jakob Voss, based on art designer at PLoS, modified by Wikipedia users Nina and Beao
SSRN Electronic Journal
Article . 2015 . Peer-reviewed
Data sources: Crossref
versions View all 5 versions
addClaim

Lying About Delegation

Authors: Vranceanu, Radu; Sutan, A.;

Lying About Delegation

Abstract

Abstract This paper reports results from a three-player variant of the ultimatum game in which the Proposer can delegate to a third party his decision regarding how to share his endowment with a Responder with a standard veto right. However, the Responder cannot verify whether the delegation is effective or the third party merely plays a “scapegoat” role, while the decision is made by the Proposer himself. In this uncertain attribution setting, the Proposer can send an unverifiable message declaring his delegation strategy. One possible strategy is “false delegation”, in which the Proposer makes the decision but claims to have delegated it. In our sample, the recourse to false delegation is significant, and a significant number of potential Delegates accept serving in the scapegoat role. However, there are many honest Proposers, and 20% of all Delegates will refuse to be the accomplices of a dishonest Proposer. Responders tend to more readily accept poor offers in a setup that permits lying about delegation; the acceptance rate of the poor offer is the highest when Delegates can refuse the scapegoat role.

Country
France
Keywords

delegation of responsibility; lies; communications strategy; ultimatum game; dishonesty, [CHIM] Chemical Sciences, ultimatum game, dishonesty, lies, communications strategy,delegation of responsibility, jel: jel:C91, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:D82

  • BIP!
    Impact byBIP!
    selected citations
    These citations are derived from selected sources.
    This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).
    9
    popularity
    This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.
    Top 10%
    influence
    This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).
    Average
    impulse
    This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.
    Average
Powered by OpenAIRE graph
Found an issue? Give us feedback
selected citations
These citations are derived from selected sources.
This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).
BIP!Citations provided by BIP!
popularity
This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.
BIP!Popularity provided by BIP!
influence
This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).
BIP!Influence provided by BIP!
impulse
This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.
BIP!Impulse provided by BIP!
9
Top 10%
Average
Average
Upload OA version
Are you the author of this publication? Upload your Open Access version to Zenodo!
It’s fast and easy, just two clicks!