On the Optimality of Not Allocating

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Other literature type , Preprint 01 Jan 2014 United Kingdom, Italy English Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:SSRN Electronic Journal (eissn: 1556-5068,

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Authors: Hernando-Veciana A.; Michelucci F.;

doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2468924 , 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.016

handle: 10016/20439 , 10278/3719977

On the Optimality of Not Allocating

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Abstract

We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit.

Countries

United Kingdom, Italy

Related Organizations

Charles University
Czech Republic
Durham University
United Kingdom
Czech Academy of Sciences
Czech Republic
Carlos III University of Madrid
Spain
Complutense University of Madrid
Spain

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Keywords

efficiency; auctions; mechanism design;, Auctions, Mechanism design, Auctions; Efficiency; Mechanism design, Efficiency, mechanism design, Economía, Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, D82, efficiency, auctions, D44, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:D44

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