Sequential Decisions in the Diamond-Dybvig Banking Model
Copyright policy )Sequential Decisions in the Diamond-Dybvig Banking Model
We study the Diamond-Dybvig model of fi nancial intermediation (JPE, 1983) under the assumption that depositors have information about previous decisions. Depositors decide sequentially whether to withdraw their funds or continue holding them in the bank. If depositors observe the history of all previous decisions, we show that there are no bank runs in equilibrium independently of whether the realized type vector selected by nature is of perfect or imperfect information.
ddc:330, C72, D82, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Bank Run, Imperfect Information, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Bank Run, HB5 Mathematical economics / matematikai közgazdaságtan, G21, HB Economic Theory / közgazdaságtudomány, Imperfect Information, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:G21
ddc:330, C72, D82, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Bank Run, Imperfect Information, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Bank Run, HB5 Mathematical economics / matematikai közgazdaságtan, G21, HB Economic Theory / közgazdaságtudomány, Imperfect Information, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:G21
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