Despite the official doctrine of the United Nations, supported by the General Assembly and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights, the status of cultural, as well as of economic and social rights in the family of human rights has for a long time been a matter of vivid discussions of both legal practitioners and political philosophers. A somewhat newly emerged issue in this debate concerns the legal nature of the guaranteed rights. Even though the ICESCR seems to stipulate that only individuals are vested with cultural rights (using the formulation “the right of everyone”), recent expert-based initiatives, such as the 2007 Fribourg Declaration on Cultural Rights, employ the concept of 'cultural communities' as well, implicating that both individual members of those communities and communities themselves can be holders of the said rights.This paper will try to shed more light on the legal nature of various rights, commonly considered as 'cultural'. I will, first, try to revisit certain terminological and conceptual indeterminacies surrounding 'cultural rights', which are corollary of different disciplinary approaches to the subject-matter. In that respect, I will briefly tackle specificities of the approaches taken by political philosophy, anthropology and legal analysis. Since this paper focuses on the question whether some cultural rights can be in the legal sense treated as collective rights, in the next step I will provide a sketch of the defensible legal-theoretical grounding of the latter concept. In doing so, I will argue that collective rights primarily have to be differentiated from rights exercised 'in community with others', since 'the exercising criterion' cannot be definitional of a collective right. Furthermore, they have to be distinguished from the individual rights accorded to a particular subset of persons, such as 'students' or 'law professors', because these categories of persons cannot be equated with collective entities, such as peoples, minorities or indigenous peoples. Finally, I will try to determine which cultural rights, if any, could qualify for the status of collective rights. This legal-philosophical treatment of the subject matter will not only help in elucidating the inconsistent practice in the relevant fields of law, but it will, ideally, provide useful guidelines for both policy makers and adjudicators.