Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions
Copyright policy )Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions
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- Leibniz Association Germany
- Cowles Foundation United States
- Yale University United States
- Centre For European Economic Research Germany
- University of Cologne Germany
Independent private value auction, Sequential disclosure, Ascending auctions, Information structure, Interim equilibrium, Posterior equilibrium, 330, posterior equilibrium, sequential disclosure, Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, ascending auctions, independent private value auction, interim equilibrium, information structure, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:D83, jel: jel:D44
Independent private value auction, Sequential disclosure, Ascending auctions, Information structure, Interim equilibrium, Posterior equilibrium, 330, posterior equilibrium, sequential disclosure, Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, ascending auctions, independent private value auction, interim equilibrium, information structure, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:D82, jel: jel:D83, jel: jel:D44
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