Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Charcterization
Copyright policy )Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Charcterization
Abstract A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, “Do not lie if you do not have to”, to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of $$ n\ge 3$$ n ≥ 3 individuals, a social choice rule that can be Nash implemented is termed partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper offers a complete characterization of the (unanimous) social choice rules that are partially-honestly Nash implementable. When all individuals are partially-honest, then any (unanimous) rule is partially-honestly Nash implementable. An account of the welfare implications of partially-honest Nash implementation is provided in a variety of environments.
- University of Liverpool United Kingdom
- Kochi University of Technology Japan
- UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW
- University of Glasgow
- University of Massachusetts Amherst United States
condition \(\mu^*\)(ii), Implementation, Nash equilibrium, social choice correspondences, partial honesty, Condition μ, Economics, Condition μ∗, Social choice, Associations, Condition μ, Nash equilibrium, C72, D71, partial-honesty, Condition μ*, C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory, partial honesty, D71 - Social Choice, pure strategy Nash equilibrium, C72 - Noncooperative Games, ddc:330, Clubs, Nash implementation, Implementation, Nash equilibrium, social choice correspondences, partial honesty, Condition μ*., Mechanism design theory, Committees, Implementation, social choice correspondences, D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making, jel: jel:C7, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:D71, jel: jel:D7
condition \(\mu^*\)(ii), Implementation, Nash equilibrium, social choice correspondences, partial honesty, Condition μ, Economics, Condition μ∗, Social choice, Associations, Condition μ, Nash equilibrium, C72, D71, partial-honesty, Condition μ*, C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory, partial honesty, D71 - Social Choice, pure strategy Nash equilibrium, C72 - Noncooperative Games, ddc:330, Clubs, Nash implementation, Implementation, Nash equilibrium, social choice correspondences, partial honesty, Condition μ*., Mechanism design theory, Committees, Implementation, social choice correspondences, D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making, jel: jel:C7, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:D71, jel: jel:D7
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