
We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these assumptions, the limit set depends on the Markov chain only through its invariant measure. The (limit) equilibrium payoffs are the feasible payoffs that satisfy an individual rationality condition for the receiver, and an incentive compatibility condition for the sender.
FOS: Computer and information sciences, 330, communication, Probability (math.PR), [SHS.ECO.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance/domain_shs.eco.eco, sender-receiver; dynamic games; bayesian games; communication; repeated games, sender-receiver, bayesian games, repeated games, dynamic games, [SHS.ECO.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance/domain_shs.eco.eco, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, FOS: Mathematics, 60J10, 91A05, 91A10, 91A20, B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE, Mathematics - Probability, Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT), jel: jel:C73, jel: jel:D83
FOS: Computer and information sciences, 330, communication, Probability (math.PR), [SHS.ECO.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance/domain_shs.eco.eco, sender-receiver; dynamic games; bayesian games; communication; repeated games, sender-receiver, bayesian games, repeated games, dynamic games, [SHS.ECO.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance/domain_shs.eco.eco, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, FOS: Mathematics, 60J10, 91A05, 91A10, 91A20, B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE, Mathematics - Probability, Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT), jel: jel:C73, jel: jel:D83
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