Majority Rules and Coalitional Stability
Copyright policy )Majority Rules and Coalitional Stability
We consider a class of symmetric games with externalities across coalitions and show that, under certain regularity conditions, restricting the deviating power to majority guarantees the existence of core-stable allocations. We also show that if majorities can extract resources from minorities, stability requires a supermajority rule, whose threshold is increasing in the extraction power.
- Ca Foscari University of Venice Italy
- Roma Tre University Italy
- University of Leicester United Kingdom
- Sapienza University of Rome Italy
Majority Rule, Supermajority, Externalities, Core, coalitions; core, Majority Rule, Supermajority, Externalities, Core., games with externalities; majority rules; core, jel: jel:D7, jel: jel:C7
Majority Rule, Supermajority, Externalities, Core, coalitions; core, Majority Rule, Supermajority, Externalities, Core., games with externalities; majority rules; core, jel: jel:D7, jel: jel:C7
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