Governing a Common-Pool Resource in a Directed Network
Copyright policy )Governing a Common-Pool Resource in a Directed Network
A local public-good game played on directed networks is analyzed. The model is motivated by one-way flows of hydrological influence between cities of a river basin that may shape the level of their contribution to the conservation of wetlands. It is shown that in many (but not all) directed networks, there exists an equilibrium, sometimes socially desirable, in which some stakeholders exert maximal effort and the others free ride. It is also shown that more directed links are not always better. Finally, the model is applied to the conservation of wetlands in the Gironde estuary (France).
- University of Bordeaux France
- University of Bordeaux France
ddc:330, Common-pool Resource, Digraph, Independent Set, Cycle, C72, Empirical Example, Common-pool Resource, Digraph, Cycle, Independent Set, Empirical Example, H41, D85, jel: jel:D85, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:H41
ddc:330, Common-pool Resource, Digraph, Independent Set, Cycle, C72, Empirical Example, Common-pool Resource, Digraph, Cycle, Independent Set, Empirical Example, H41, D85, jel: jel:D85, jel: jel:C72, jel: jel:H41
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