Institutional dialogue is particularly important in the United States where the internal assessments of international legal obligations are often seen, rightly or wrongly, through the lens of its Constitution. This founding document divides the powers of government into three branches, and the result has often been a passing along of the state’s international legal duties with each branch maintaining a plausible lack of responsibility. More recently, a manner in which national courts have dealt with this difficulty is by employing a ‘judicial ladder of review’ meant to prompt an inter-branch dialogue over fundamental duties found in different categories of law, with the court playing the role of moderator. This work will analyze a series of cases (Rasul, Hamdan, and Boumediene) that have come before the Supreme Court of the United States dealing with pertinent international norms for counterterrorism, and that can simultaneously be found in domestic and constitutional law. Through this investigation, we will see that the US Supreme Court indeed initiated such an institutional colloquy with the executive and legislature in an attempt to affect the final legal policies of the nation. While the other branches of government implemented policies and passed legislation that poorly interpreted the applicable law, the highest national court methodically employed this novel judicial tool, extending rights across borders and nationalities, so as to take the historic step of eschewing the traditional deference shown by courts in times of armed conflict. In so doing, the Court was measured, patient and resolute in its push back against the removal of judicial review for those held in detention at Guantanamo in the ‘war on terror.’